This paper explores sources of deposit dollarization unrelated to standard moral hazard arguments. We argue that the equal treatment of peso and dollar claims on a bank in the event of default can induce banks to attract dollar deposits above the socially desirable level. The distortion arises because dollar depositors are the only source of default risk in the model, but they share the burden of the default with peso depositors as interest rates cannot be set contingent to the (unobserved) level of deposit dollarization. The incentive to dollarize is reinforced by common banking system safety nets such as deposit and bank insurance. Our findings suggest that regulators in bi-currency economies should depart from the currency-blind benchmark and instead distinguish across currencies in a way that prevents undesirable currency mismatches, even in the absence of moral hazard related to the relaxation of market discipline.
despite the evidence suggesting its empirical relevance in many emerging markets (see Baliño, Bennett, and Borensztein, 1999) . In principle there are reasons why domestic savers may prefer to save in dollars rather than in domestic currency (henceforth, for simplicity, the peso). Thomas (1985) and Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) explain the process of dollarization as an optimal portfolio choice by depositors. These models, however, ignore important aspects of the financial intermediation process such as the balance-sheet imbalances caused by currency mismatches. In this paper we abstract from the depositor's decision and focus on whether it may be in the best interest of banks in emerging markets to attract dollar deposits. By acquiring dollar deposits, banks face a trade-off between low dollar rates (i.e., low funding costs) and high default risks associated with currency mismatch. We are interested in examining under what conditions the former effect dominates the latter and whether these conditions induce excessive dollarization by banks. We also address the implications for bank regulators in emerging markets.
In our model, limited-liability banks choose the currency composition of their liabilities. They collect peso and dollar deposits from risk-neutral depositors to finance domestic projects with known peso returns. Depositors, in turn, do not observe the currency composition of bank deposits. Exchange rate risk is the sole source of uncertainty in the model. The presence of dollar deposits gives rise to a currency imbalance in the banks' balance sheet that implies that low exchange rate states (i.e., peso depreciations) are associated with bank insolvency. In this context, the loss-sharing policy between different types of deposits in the event of bank default is the key to distinguishing between the banks' and the central planner's valuation of dollar deposits.
We show that an equal treatment of peso and dollar deposits in the event of a bank liquidation (understood as the case in which the residual value of the bank is distributed on a pro rata basis among all depositors according to the value of their claims at the time of liquidation) creates an incentive for banks to dollarize. In this case, the cost for banks of funding their investment using dollar relative to peso deposits increases as the peso depreciates. Risk-neutral depositors price this benefit of dollar deposits into lower dollar rates relative to peso rates. However, due to limitedliability, banks do not pay the higher costs of dollar deposits in the event of default and thus find it cheaper to finance their projects through dollar funding. We show that this effect leads to excessive deposit dollarization relative to a central planner's choice.
1. A number of papers have build upon the currency mismatch that arise in these models to generate currency crisis models. They include Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000) , Dooley (1997) , McKinnon and Pill (1998) , Corsetti, Roubini, and Pesenti (1999) , and Chang and Velasco (1999) .
2. With a few exceptions, the literature that tackled deposit dollarization has typically focused on currency substitution rather than asset substitution issues, despite the fact that the bulk of observed dollarization has occurred in the savings component of broad money (interest bearing deposits) with little, if any, currency substitution happening in practice.
Our paper differs from the foreign borrowing literature cited above in the causes underlying dollarization. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002) , the incentive for firms to issue excessive dollar debt arises from the interaction between the value of dollar collateral and the presence of financial constraints. In Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001b) and Dooley (1997) , the free insurance provided by the government induces banks to borrow from abroad. By contrast, our result is not driven by the presence of government or private guarantees. Instead, the incentive to dollarize arises as a result of a positive correlation between default risk and currency risk, which we believe characterizes most developing economies, coupled with a currencyblind liquidation or loss-sharing policy, that is, one that distributes the residual value of the failed bank among depositors according to the value of their claims. 3 The introduction of free (deposit or bank) insurance that does not discriminate between currencies simply reinforces the dollarization bias unveiled by the model. For instance, full deposit insurance increases the return for depositors of holding dollar deposits relative to peso deposits in the event of default (i.e., when the peso depreciates). This is priced in by depositors as lower dollar rates, which reinforces the previously mentioned externality to the bank, and induces further dollarization. However, as in the absence of deposit insurance, the incentive to dollarize arises from the banks' mispricing of exchange rate risk rather than from the standard moral hazard consequences of insurance. This is not to deny the moral hazard consequences of free insurance, which are present as an additional force inducing deposit dollarization. For instance, a lender of last resort (LLR) that provides insurance to banks irrespective of their level of dollarization reduces the cost of risk-taking, which in the context of the model leads to a higher equilibrium share of dollar deposits. 4 Banks are willing to increase the level of dollar funding as they transfer part of the exposure to the provider of the insurance services. This result is analogous to that in Kareken and Wallace (1978) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001b) who find that, in the presence of government guarantees, it is optimal for limited-liability banks to hold as risky a portfolio as permissible to maximize the value of the guarantee. In our case, risk appetite (and the associated dollarization bias) is mitigated because of an additional intertemporal value effect that reduces the incentive to dollarize as risk increases.
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A different form of bank insurance comes from the (explicit or implicit) commitment of the Central Bank to defend the price of the domestic currency. Unlike Dooley (1997) , we find that a government's promise to defend the exchange rate has ambiguous effects on the equilibrium dollarization.
3. This treatment tends to be the rule in practice. For instance, bankruptcy laws do not adjust creditors' assets for their currency of denomination. For a summary of how prudential regulation deals with foreign exchange risk, see Abrams and Beato (1998) .
4. The standard moral hazard effect is associated with Grossman and Hart (1983) . They stress that the possibility of a bailout reduces the incentive to exert effort and encourages managerial shirking and risk-taking. See Freixas and Rochet (1997) chap. 9 for applications to bank insurance.
5. Blum (1999) describes a similar effect when assessing the effect of capital adequacy rules in the banks' riskiness. Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2003) discuss extensively this value effect when examining the impact of bank insurance on banks' risk appetite.
While the source of endogenous dollarization depicted in our paper is independent of the presence of safety nets, standard banking practices (such as deposit insurance or central bank assistance) that do not discriminate between currencies reinforce this externality. For instance, central banks are not known to base their assistance to particular banks on the currency composition of their portfolios above and beyond what is required by prudential regulations. Moreover, currency-blind deposit insurance is the rule rather than the exception. In her extensive survey, Garcia (1999) finds that less than 20 out of 72 countries with bi-currency financial systems discriminate against foreign-currency deposits by excluding them from the insurance coverage. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) find evidence that deposit insurance which includes coverage for foreign currency increases the probability of a bank run. 6 Our investigation calls for a revision of these common banking practices. Finally, the model also highlights an interesting empirical implication, namely, that the peso-dollar interest rate spread typically used to measure currency risk generally underestimates devaluation expectations, the more so the larger the deposit dollarization ratio. This prediction is consistent with evidence presented in Schmukler and Servén (2002) . They show that in highly dollarized Argentina and Hong Kong, forward discounts exceed the currency premium implicit in bank interest rates, particularly during currency runs when deposit dollarization tends to peak.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1 we present the basic model and describe the centralized and decentralized equilibria with no deposit or bank insurance. In section 2 we analyze how insurance affects the degree of deposit dollarization in the economy. In Section 3 we look at the empirical implications of the results for the measurement of currency risk based on market interest rates. In Section 4 we discuss alternative mechanisms to undo endogenous dollarization. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize the main findings and potential extensions, and conclude.
THE MODEL
In each period, banks and depositors play a simple game. Banks with limitedliability collect dollar and peso funds from risk-neutral depositors to finance their investment. Depositors, in turn, have the option to save using a risk-free asset in addition to the dollar and peso deposits. Therefore, they demand deposit rates so as to make expected returns on deposits in each currency equal the risk-free rate. Moreover, we assume that depositors do not observe the currency composition of the bank's deposits. This is the only source of imperfect information in the model. Finally, a Nash equilibrium is obtained where banks decide the optimal currency composition of their deposit portfolio, and depositors use rational expectations when setting interest rates.
6. They suggest that, just as in the case of general deposit insurance, foreign-currency coverage may stimulate banks' risk-taking behavior due to standard moral hazard considerations. We provide a different explanation for this link between insurance and the propensity to banking crises: the extension of insurance to foreign-currency bank liabilities endogenously drives up dollarization, which, in turn, leaves banks more exposed to currency risk. Thus, even in the absence of market discipline, dollar deposit insurance contributes to financial fragility.
The assumption that depositors do not observe the currency composition of deposits captures a more general presumption that depositors may not know the extent of the overall currency mismatch of a bank. Determining this currency mismatch would not only require knowing the currency composition of deposits, which in many cases is not disclosed or is informed after a considerable lag, but also gathering and processing information about the banks' hedging activities and the currency denomination of other bank assets or liabilities. Given the lack of transparency in many developing countries' banking sectors, the intricacies of banks' balance sheets, and the costs of handling this information, we believe this assumption to be highly realistic.
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Consider the case of limited-liability banks endowed with an investment technology that uses 1 dollar (or 1/e pesos, where e is the dollar/peso exchange rate) to produce R pesos at the end of the period. Normalizing the current exchange rate e 0 ϭ 1, assume that the end-of-period exchange rate is distributed according to f(e) with support [0, ∞), f(0) ϭ 0, and mean e m . 8 For simplicity, assume that the distribution of end-of-period exchange rate changes is identical in each period (i.e., does not depend on history). Exchange rate risk is the only source of risk in this economy.
The assumption that investment returns are denominated in pesos captures the fact that in most of the economies with financial dollarization, there is a currency mismatch somewhere in the economy. 9 For simplicity, we model this currency mismatch explicitly in the bank's balance sheet. An alternative way, however, would be to allow banks denominate their loans in dollars and match the currency composition of their liabilities (as they typically do in practice due to prudential limits on the currency position). In this case, the recovery value of dollar loans would still be limited by the peso-income of the borrowing firm, and thus will decline in the event of a depreciation. In other words, by lending in dollars, banks would simply shift the currency mismatch to the firms (increasing exchange raterelated credit risk in return), rendering the same outcome for the banks as when the mismatch is modeled explicitly in their balance sheets. 10 7. While central banks are becoming increasingly transparent in terms of data disclosure and dissemination, the widespread existence of state-owned banks and cumbersome accounting procedures in emerging markets still suggest that depositors need to incur substantial costs to obtain the relevant information.
8. We can think of e as driven by exogenous shocks, with low values (large depreciations) corresponding to bad states of nature.
9. A common characteristic of bank defaults in developing markets (e.g., Chile 1982 , Thailand 1997 , and Argentina 2002 is the existence of some type of currency mismatch in banks' balance sheets. In general, this arises because the degree of financial dollarization exceeds the fraction of the real economy effectively dollarized (tradable sector). The results can be readily extended to include the case in which a fraction of borrowers have foreign-denominated income. See also Note 10.
10. Gavin and Hausmann (1996) have made a similar point in the case of the Chilean banking crisis of 1982: "in a dollarized economy where the exchange rate has been credibly fixed, the structure of assets and liabilities will reflect the expectations of exchange rate stability, which will cause an accumulation of dollar-denominated debt in both the nontradable and household sector. This will make an exchange rate adjustment particularly devastating for bank solvency since there will be significant exchange rate risk hidden in the form of credit risk, as in the Chilean crisis of 1982." Of course, in the case that the borrowing firm has its income in dollars, then the currency imbalance dissappears. The bank's objective function can be expressed as (in dollar terms):
, with
where λ is the share of dollar deposits, r p and r d are the (gross) interest rates of peso and dollar deposits, respectively, and P(λ) is the probability that the bank does not default. 11 Due to the recursive nature of the problem we can drop the time subscript t. The profit function can be restated as:
where e c denotes the critical value of end-of-period exchange rate below which bank liabilities exceed bank assets, and ē(λ) is the average exchange rate conditional on the bank's not defaulting, that is,
For future reference, note that ē Ͼ e m Ͼ e c . In the absence of insurance, when a bank defaults it is liquidated at a discount 0 Ͻ θ ≤ 1 and the residual value of the liquidated bank, θR, is distributed among depositors (in a way to be discussed below).
13 Finally, we assume that R is such that, for any liquidation cost θ, it is efficient to have a positive level of investment, that is,
where r f ≥ 1 is the risk-free rate.
In the absence of a deposit or bank insurance scheme, interest rates depend crucially on the way the bank's assets are distributed among depositors in the event 11. As will become clear below, two reasons underlie our use of an infinite horizon to model the bank's problem. First, it introduces the cost of losing the flow of expected future profits (the bank's charter value), a factor that partially offsets dollarization incentives. Second, it allows us to discuss the moral hazard effect related with central bank assistance (or other bank insurance policies).
12. For future reference note that e′ c Ͼ 0 implies that P′ Ͻ 0 (see the "Useful Properties" section in the Appendix).
13. It is important to note at this point that the results do not depend on the existence of a liquidation discount. As will become clear below, liquidation costs are introduced solely to capture in a simple way the sub-optimality of default risk.
of default (what we henceforth refer to as the "liquidation policy"). Any liquidation policy can be generally characterized by the recovery ratios δ i (λ,e) applicable to deposits in currency i, defined as the share of the deposit certificate that is repaid at maturity. The fact that the (dollar) residual value of the bank, eθR, is completely distributed among depositors implies that these ratios have to satisfy the following aggregate constraint:
(
Denoting the expected recovery ratio (again, expressed in dollars) of a unit of currency i-denominated deposit in the event of a default by S i (λ,e), where i ϭ p,d, we obtain:
In turn, using Equation (4), depositors' returns must satisfy the following arbitrage condition:
where λ e ϭ E(λ), and depositors form expectations rationally. Finally, from Equation (9) it follows that the expected peso-dollar spread is given by:
For future reference, s(λ e ) ≡ S d r d Ϫ S p r p is a measure of the expected cross-transfer from peso deposits to dollar deposits in the event of a default. Note that, if the liquidation policy implies that the recovery value of dollar deposits is higher than the recovery value of peso deposits, then there is a transfer of resources from peso to dollar depositors that have to be compensated by a higher expected return of peso deposits in non-default states. More precisely, the higher the cross-transfer, the higher the peso-dollar spread demanded by risk-neutral depositors. The general link between liquidation policies and the cross-transfer is summarized in the following remark:
, and s(0) ϭ 0. In particular, a currency-blind liquidation policy that grants equal treatment across deposits of different currencies (that is, δ p ϭ δ d ), by fully recognizing the exchange rate insurance of dollar deposits in the event of default, induces a widening of the peso-dollar spread.
14 More precisely, if
14. This simple liquidation policy can be used to illustrate the effects that post-default exchange rates have on the recovery values of deposits in different currencies. Assume that the pre-default exchange rate is 1 dollar ϭ 1 peso and that the post-default exchange rate is 1 dollar ϭ 3 pesos. Finally assume a liquidation policy that has δ p ϭ δ d ϭ 0.5 (i.e., equal treatment of deposits, both receive half the value of their claims at the time of liquidation). Then, a 1-dollar deposit would receive 1.5 pesos back when the bank defaults, and the peso deposit would only receive 0.5 pesos.
then, using r d Ϫ r p e c Ͼ 0, 15 we obtain
On the other extreme, a liquidation policy that completely ignores valuation gains (as, e.g., in the case of a compulsory conversion of dollar deposits to the local currency at the ex-ante rate e 0 ) would entail
. Thus, such a policy would favor the currency that is expected to depreciate, as it would benefit from higher deposit rates in default states.
While the arguments made below are valid for a variety of different liquidation schemes, in the following sections we restrict our attention to the realistic case of a currency-blind, pro rata liquidation policy as described in Equation (11).
Centralized Equilibrium
As a useful benchmark, we present the solution for the optimal dollarization share in a centralized equilibrium. A risk-neutral central planner maximizes the expected return to investment minus expected funding and liquidation costs, taking into account the effect the composition of liabilities, λ, has on the deposit interest rates. We then obtain,
where
. The first term in Equation (13) is the expected return on the bank's investment, and the second and third terms are the expected funding and liquidation costs, respectively.
Proposition 1: For θ Ͻ 1, the optimal share of dollar deposits is λ* ϭ 0. For θ ϭ 1, the central planner is indifferent about the composition of funding.
Proof: The result follows immediately from e′ c Ͼ 0. ■ In other words, in the presence of liquidation costs it is optimal that banks fully hedge exchange rate risk by demanding no dollar deposits. The intuition is 15. From Equation (9), and using e c Ͻ e m :
f(e)de ϩ ͐ (1 Ϫ δ(λ,e))f(e)de Kareken and Wallace (1978) .
Decentralized Equilibrium (Perfect Information)
Before examining the impact of the imperfect information at the core of the paper, we present the solution of the game in the case where depositors can observe the currency composition of the bank deposits, λ, prior to setting interest rates (alternatively, depositors can make interest rates contingent on deposit dollarization).
Under perfect information, bank profits can be restated as,
where r p (λ) and r d (λ) are set contingent to the (observable) degree of dollarization, λ. Substituting Equation (9) into Equation (15), profits can be written as follows:
In turn, using Equations (6)- (8), the last expression can be simplified to obtain
which coincides with the maximand of the static social planner's problem in Equation (14). In addition, deposit dollarization increases the probability of default, negatively affecting the value of the bank (see Equation 1) even in the absence of liquidation costs. Proposition 2 follows immediately. Proposition 2: Under perfect information, the optimal share of dollar deposits for the individual bank is λ ϭ 0.
Proof: Same as in Proposition 1, noting that, for λ Ͼ 0, P(λ) Ͼ P(0) ϭ 0 in Equation (1). ■ That is, in a setting where depositors can observe λ, it is optimal for banks to fully hedge exchange rate risk by choosing λ ϭ 0 to avoid the probability of bankruptcy due to balance-sheet effects.
Decentralized Equilibrium (Imperfect Information)
We are now ready to analyze the imperfect information case where the dollar share of bank deposits, λ, is only observed by the bank. A Nash equilibrium is defined as the triplet (λ D , r p , r d ) such that banks choose λ to maximize Equation (1) taking (λ e , r p , r d ) as given, Condition (Equation 9) holds, and the rational expectation condition, λ e ϭ λ D , is satisfied. Differentiating Equation (1) with respect to the dollarization ratio λ, we obtain the following first order condition:
In turn, using
and Equation (10), we get:
and
From Equations (17) and (18) it can be easily seen that:
(i) If s(λ) Ͼ 0, the solution to the static problem (maximization of current profits, Equation 2) is always at the corner λ ϭ 1.
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(ii) There is an intertemporal effect that reduces the incentive to dollarize, as the bank's expected future value falls by the term ρ P ′ V when the share of dollar deposits (and the probability of default) increases.
It can be proven that, for a low discount factor ρ, the stimulus to dollarize prevails, as the following proposition formally states:
where e 1 ϭ e(λ e ϭ 0,λ ϭ 1), s(λ) Ͼ 0 implies that any decentralized equilibrium λ D must satisfy λ D Ͼ λ* ϭ 0. Proof: See appendix for proof. ■ The main intuition behind this proposition comes from the effect that the liquidation policy has on the wedge between the effective funding costs in pesos and dollars for the bank relative to the market price of peso and dollar deposits. Since banks only pay depositors in non-default states, the relative peso funding cost is given by
, where ē is the average exchange rate for those states. When the liquidation policy entails no cross-transfer (s ϭ 0), no additional premium is required by peso deposit holders in non-default states (from Equation 10, r p ē ϭ r d ). Then, absent any benefit of dollar funding, the banks shy away from dollar deposits to avoid default risk.
As the cross-transfer increases, s Ͼ 0, the expected recovery value for dollar relative to pesos deposits rises, and with it the peso-dollar spread demanded by depositors. This higher spread introduces a positive wedge between the effective funding cost of peso deposits relative to dollar deposits (r p ē Ϫ r d Ͼ 0). This cost advantage associated with dollar funding eventually dominates the disincentives arising from the intertemporal effect, inducing deposit dollarization.
16. The problem is convex, and π′ ≥ 0 for all λ. This implies bang-bang solutions similar to those found in Suárez (1993) . The model can be easily extended to include liquidity services of the domestic currency. While in this case the solution to the problem may be interior, our main result, namely that there is a positive link between s and λ, still holds.
Thus, in our simple setup, deposit dollarization is entirely accounted for by the cross-transfers implicit in the liquidation policy. Note, in particular, that there is no need for a government guarantee, in the form of deposit or bank insurance, for the result to hold. Simple recognition of the currency of denomination of the deposit contract is enough to generate the result. 17 2. INSURANCE Previously, we showed how the loss-sharing implicit in default events resulted in endogenous dollarization. In this section we introduce deposit and bank insurance to explore how each of these standard safety nets influences the incentives for endogenous dollarization. In the final part of this section, we explore the consequences of an anticipated exchange rate defense as an alternative insurance mechanism against exchange rate shocks.
Deposit Insurance
The framework of the previous section can be readily applied to analyze the effect of an (implicit or explicit) currency-blind deposit insurance scheme (DIS) on the equilibrium share of dollar deposits. For expositional purposes, in what follows we assume that the DIS is financed through lump-sum taxes. Using the same argument as in Proposition 3, it can be shown that, for sufficiently low discount factors, zero deposit dollarization can never be achieved in equilibrium under deposit insurance. More formally, from Equation (20) it follows that: 17. Note that our results are not driven by the assumption of full deposit financing. We could alternatively assume that banks contribute equity capital K per unit of deposit, which would simply reduce the critical exchange rate e c (λ;K) ≡
. As expected, capital would reduce the probability of default and allow for negative bank profits, without altering the qualitative results of the paper. In particular, while the incentives to dollarize should weaken, full dollarization would still be the solution to the static game.
18. This case, which assumes that DIS outlays are financed ex-post through the government budget, broadly corresponds to cases of implicit insurance or flat-rate, underpriced DIS. The analysis can be easily generalized to other financing strategies as long as they do not discriminate across currencies.
19. Note that δ DIS ϭ k would imply that, for some states of nature, k Ͻ δ(λ,e), so that depositors will be distributed less than the residual value of the bank with the difference accruing to the DIS agency, an arguably unrealistic situation. ■ Note that, as in Proposition 3, the result is driven by the effect the DIS has on the current relative pricing of deposits and not from the well-known moral hazard consequences of insurance. From the depositors' standpoint, the DIS enhances the insurance properties of the dollar by enlarging the fraction of dollar deposits that are protected against exchange rate risk for non-default states. This increases dollar deposits' attractiveness as a hedge against large devaluations and induces peso depositors to demand a compensating premium that creates a wedge between the market spread and the effective relative costs to the bank. It is interesting to note that, whenever the cost of the DIS is sustained by the government, the scheme can be viewed as a tax on depositors in both currencies whereby proceeds are allocated disproportionately among dollar depositors.
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Less straightforward is the question of whether a DIS strengthens or weakens the incentive to dollarize. On the one hand, it follows directly from Equation (20) that, for given interest rates, the DIS increases the cross-transfer s(λ) and hence banks' incentives to dollarize their liabilities. However, the DIS also increases the pool of resources to be distributed among depositors and, as a result, reduces interest rates. Lower funding costs reduce the probability of default, detracting from the attractiveness of dollar deposits as well as increasing the strength of the intertemporal effect (as larger charter values reduce the banks' risk-taking propensity). Thus, whether the introduction of a DIS reduces or increases endogenous dollarization will generally depend on the parameters of the problem.
The case of full DIS (k ϭ 1) helps to illustrate the intuition behind these two opposing effects. First note that, under a full DIS, the peso-dollar spread should simply reflect devaluation expectations, so that, for any expected dollarization ratio λ 
The first (pro-dollarization) effect can be seen by comparing Condition (Equation 18) with and without deposit insurance. Using the fact that without deposit insurance 21 20. Note also that the result still holds when the DIS is funded through bank contributions (e.g., a tax on profits), as long as the insurance premium does not depend on risk (i.e., the currency of denomination). In this case,
is computed ex-ante based on rational expectations, so that the expected net outlays of the DIS are fully funded by banks.
21. Condition (Equation 10) can be written as: 
suggests that:
Thus, for any given pair of deposit rates, the cross-transfer from peso to dollar deposits is higher under full deposit insurance than under no insurance. Deposit insurance also has effects on the level of interest rates. Full deposit insurance implies that funding costs fall as r DIS d ϭ r f Ͻ r d and ē DIS Ͻ ē. This implies that we cannot rule out cases in which the marginal impact on current revenues from increasing the dollarization ratio under deposit insurance is smaller than without insurance, that is, π′ DIS Ͻ π′. Moreover, deposit insurance, through its effect on bank funding costs, also tends to reduce the default probability, and therefore reduce the incentive to dollarize.
As noted in Section 1.2, it is important to examine how these results are altered under perfect information. In this case, deposit rates have to satisfy the following condition,
where denote the expected recovery ratios for any given (observed) dollarization ratio λ.
Replacing Equation (24) into Equation (15), we can express profits as
To compare with the perfect information case under no insurance, it is useful to replace Equations (25) and (26) into Equation (27), to rewrite profits as:
denotes deposit insurance outlays net of the residual value of the defaulting bank. N(λ) also represents the increase in the expected recovery ratio due to the presence of deposit insurance. In particular, note that N ϭ 0 for λ ϭ 0 (no default) and N Ͼ 0 for any λ Ͼ 0 such that there is a positive default probability. Thus, to the extent that it provides any coverage to depositors beyond what would be recouped from the liquidation of the bank, the DIS introduces a dollarization incentive that is proportional to the DIS coverage, k. The intuition for this incentive is clearest for the limiting case of full deposit insurance (k ϭ 1) where interest rates no longer depend on the bank's choice of dollarization. This implies that the return of deposits is completely delinked from banks' currency composition of deposits, and therefore banks can incur in additional risk without affecting deposits' relative returns. Thus, with full deposit insurance, the problem that banks face under perfect information is the same as under imperfect information.
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With partial insurance, however, perfect and imperfect information problems are again distinct. The reason is that with less than complete coverage, interest rates recover, albeit partially, their sensitivity to the bank's behavior. In general, under perfect information, whether the dollarization incentive arising from deposit insurance is strong enough to induce banks to deviate from the zero dollarization equilibrium (i.e., Proposition 2) depends on the degree of insurance coverage, k. Intuitively, the higher the k, the more likely the equilibrium is characterized by a positive deposit dollarization ratio. To illustrate the point, in the appendix we derive these conditions formally for the case in which the DIS coverage always exceeds the bank's liquidation value. 
Bank Insurance
In the absence of deposit insurance, an LLR policy (or any other bank insurance policy that reduces the incidence of large devaluations on bank failures) has the same effect as a DIS inasmuch as it enlarges the range of end-of-period exchange rates over which dollar depositors are insulated from exchange rate risk. 24 However, as opposed to deposit insurance, inasmuch as it preserves the claim of shareholders on the bank charter, the LLR introduces a new incentive to dollarize above and beyond the level encouraged by the effects cited above. To distinguish between these two different channels, we assume in what follows that depositors are already covered by a full DIS.
A currency-blind LLR policy that we have in mind is the following: whenever the exchange rate at the end of the period falls below e c , with a probability β the central bank covers the gap between bank assets and liabilities at no cost. The bank's probability of survival is then given by
where , and r d (λ) ϭ r f . Replacing these expressions in Equation (15), the problem faced by banks is identical to that in Equation (1).
23. Note also that a fairly priced, risk-based insurance that takes into account the incidence of dollarization on the expected DIS outlays would entail bank contributions to the insurance fund equal to N(λ), thus eliminating the dollarization incentive.
24. We deliberately ignored the delicate question of whether institutions are solvent or liquid in the event of a large devaluation (related, among other things, to the perceived temporariness of the exchange rate adjustment), and whether indeed an LLR should assist banks in those circumstances.
Proposition 5: Under a blanket LLR policy, the equilibrium level of dollarization is weakly higher than otherwise,
Proof: From the first order condition,
it follows that a sufficient condition for λ
since P′ Ͻ 0 and
Thus, an LLR policy results in a reduction in the cost of risk to the banks (i.e., the loss of future rents) which induces risk-taking behavior. In the context of our model, this behavior implies engaging in additional dollar funding. It should be clear to the reader that these results rely on the (quite realistic) assumption that the LLR facility is available to banks irrespective of their dollarization ratio which means that the chances of preserving the insurance benefits in the event of a devaluation are enhanced without any increase in the effective cost of dollar funding to the bank. In other words, the bank benefits from lower dollar rates, transferring the cost to the LLR.
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Proposition 5 is analogous to results in Kareken and Wallace (1978) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001a) . Dollarization here arises due to the standard moral hazard consequences of insurance. However, the nature of the government guarantee is different in our paper, as the result does not hinge on the existence of bankruptcy costs as in the aforementioned papers. Furthermore, in this paper, the banks' portfolio decisions are related to the currency composition of their liabilities rather than that of their assets.
Bank Insurance (Exchange Rate Defense)
It has been pointed out in the literature that, out of concerns regarding the negative effects of a sharp devaluation on banks' balance sheets, the government 25. Again, the results remain true even if the LLR facility is fully funded through a fixed tax on bank profits determined ex-ante. may (explicitly or implicitly) intervene in the exchange rate market to limit extreme exchange rate fluctuations. By reducing exchange rate volatility, the government is reducing exchange rate risk faced by the bank (at the expense of the stock of international reserves), which should foster financial dollarization in the same way as in the previous case. 26 However, in practice there is always a limit to what a government can do to countervail shifts in the equilibrium exchange rate.
We can illustrate this point in the context of our model. Assume that the central bank is expected to intervene in the foreign exchange market to prevent the value of e from falling below e c . However, given the limited stock of reserves, for equilibrium exchange rates below a threshold 0 ≤ l Ͻ e c , the intervention is expected to fail. Thus, the government effectively modifies the exchange rate distribution faced by banks and depositors so that its support is now [l,e c )∪[e c ,∞].
An exchange rate defense policy has ambiguous effects on the equilibrium level of dollarization. Two offsetting effects of this policy can be identified. First, the exchange rate risk incurred by the bank for a given dollarization ratio is now smaller, as the set of states in which a bank defaults narrows. More precisely, the bank now avoids default with a probability
with an effect similar to that of the LLR studied previously. As in Dooley (1997) this policy acts as a bank insurance for banks and increases their incentive to dollarize at the expense of Central Bank reserves. However, this policy also reduces the probability of default (by lowering e c to l) which in turn reduces the expected cross-transfer s(λ) for any given pair of deposit rates (see Equations 7 and 8 and Remark 1). Trivially, for l ϭ 0, s(λ) ϭ 0 and, in equilibrium, λ ERD ϭ 0. Moreover, the intervention policy also changes the exchange rate distribution faced by depositors. By shifting the distribution to the right, it increases the preference for peso deposits and narrows the peso-dollar spread, again detracting from the crosstransfer and the incentives for dollar funding. Thus, the impact of expected exchange rate intervention is ambiguous. 
NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section we provide a simulation of the model presented in Section 1 to provide additional insight into the analytical results. For this purpose, we use the following Gamma distribution for the end-of-period exchange rate:
26. In different contexts, this point has been raised by Mishkin (1996) and Obstfeld (1998) . 27. A different case arises if the government is expected to bail out banks in the event of a large depreciation without intervening in the exchange rate market, for example, through the extension of subsidized liquidity assistance. Trivially, if part of the exchange rate risk is directly borne by the government, banks will face stronger incentives to fund themselves in dollars. where Γ(n) ϭ (n Ϫ 1)!. This distribution implies that e m ϭ 0.9. That is, given that e 0 ϭ 1, the expected depreciation of the currency equals 11.1%. 28 It is further assumed that depositors are covered by partial deposit insurance up to a fraction δ DIS ϭ max{δ(λ,e),k}, where k ϭ 0.7. Parameter values appear in the notes to the first figure. In particular, the choice of parameters satisfies the condition of Proposition 3 (ρ Ͻ ρ c ), so that the decentralized equilibrium implies a positive level of dollarization. Figure 1 presents the static profit function in Equation (2) for a given expected dollarization ratio, λ e ϭ 0, and the value functions in Equation (1) for λ e ϭ 0 and λ e ϭ 1. The discount factor assumed is ρ ϭ 0.4. As shown in the previous section, the static profits are increasing in λ for all λ e . However, an increase in λ also generates an increased probability of default in the future and thus reduces intertemporal profits. Figure 1 shows that for low levels of λ the intertemporal loss more than compensates for the gains in current profits. This effect gives the value function a U shape. From the value functions presented in Figure 1 it is clear that λ ϭ 0 is not an equilibrium and that λ ϭ 1 is an equilibrium. 29 It is easy to show that λ ϭ 1 is the unique equilibrium of this game. For the comparative statics that follow we adopt the case where ρ ϭ 0.4 and λ e ϭ 1 as our baseline simulation.
28. The choice of e m Ͻ 1 is purely for expositional purposes. From the previous discussion, it follows that any Gamma distribution with f(0) ϭ 0 and domain in R ϩ would yield identical qualitative results.
29. It is immediate to see that V(λ e ϭ 0,λ ϭ 0) Ͻ V(λ e ϭ 0,λ ϭ 1), which rules out an equilibrium at λ ϭ 0, and that V(λ e ϭ 1,λ ϭ 1) Ͻ V(λ e ϭ 1,λ) for all λ ʦ [0,1). Key to the main results of the paper is the fact that a bank will default in states of nature in which the local currency suffers a significant depreciation (i.e., the exchange rate falls below a critical threshold e c ). Figure 2 shows the evolution of e c , ē (the average exchange rate conditional on no default), and P, the probability of survival, as λ increases. At λ ϭ 0, both the threshold e c and the probability of default, (1 Ϫ P), are zero, and the conditional and unconditional expected exchange rate coincide (ē ϭ e m ϭ 0.9). As λ increases, e c goes up, as bank liabilities (which are now partially denominated in dollars) exceed bank assets (which are pesodenominated) for very low values of e. This implies that for λ Ͼ 0, the probability of default is higher than zero (1 Ϫ P Ͼ 0), and the conditional mean increases beyond the unconditional mean, i.e., ē Ͼ e m . As defaults are associated with low values of the exchange rate (see Figure 2) , a currency-blind liquidation policy implies that dollar returns are higher than peso returns in those states. Arbitrage requires that these higher returns be compensated by lower returns in non-default states, which, in turn, implies lower relative effective cost of dollar funding to banks by a factor proportional to s(λ) Figure 3 shows how the relative cost of peso funding increases with λ. As noted, for λ ϭ 0, the bank never defaults and the relative cost is simply one. However, as λ increases, so does the probability of default and the conditional expected exchange rate (so that banks pay only in the case of small depreciations), raising the relative effective cost of peso funding.
Proposition 3 shows that there is a critical ρ, ρ c , such that for all ρ Ͻ ρ c , the decentralized equilibrium is at λ D Ͼ 0, while for ρ ≥ ρ c , λ D ϭ 0. Figure 4 plots the value function (evaluated at λ e ϭ 0) at different values of ρ for the baseline simulation (where λ e ϭ 0.887). Only when ρ ≥ ρ c do we obtain V(λ e ϭ 1,λ ϭ 1) Ͻ V(λ e ϭ 1,λ ϭ 0), so that the equilibrium is no longer at λ ϭ 1.
Empirical Measurement of Currency Risk
Currency risk is typically (albeit incorrectly) used to denote both the currency risk premium as directly measured from differential returns on assets denominated in local and foreign currencies, and exchange rate (devaluation) expectations. An important, and often overlooked, consequence of this is the fact that the peso-dollar premium as measured from the market rates of return in each currency, is not independent from either the financial dollarization ratio or the existence of deposit or bank insurance. 30 More concretely, as indicated in Expression (22), inasmuch as there is some uninsured risk of default, the measured currency risk (r p րr d ) underestimates the true currency risk (1րe m ).
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Figure 5 illustrates this finding using the parameters of our baseline simulation. In full dollarization case, even though the true currency risk is 11.1%, the measured currency risk is only 8.5%. Note that, as the dollarization ratio approaches zero (and default risk disappears), the interest rate spread converges to the true currency risk.
30. There are other asset-specific factors that may influence the currency risk premium, such as counterparty risk. See Schmukler and Serven (2002) .
31. This mismeasurement is itself correlated, among other things, with the true level of currency risk and with liquidation costs. Indeed, it is easy to check that the higher the liquidation cost (the smaller θ), the smaller the peso-dollar spread and the higher its difference with the true currency risk. Trivially, as liquidation costs increase (and the recovery value of deposits with a failed bank falls to zero), the peso-dollar spread converges to the effective relative funding cost, The appendix shows a formal proof that this difference between the true currency risk (1րe m ) and the measured currency risk (r p րr d ) is higher for high levels of dollarization. The intuition behind the result is the following. As dollarization increases, both the recovery rate and the range of exchange rate outcomes for which exchange rate risk is perfectly insured by dollar deposits decline, making dollar deposits relatively less attractive. Conversely, the peso-dollar spread declines as we approach zero dollarization, converging to the true currency risk in the limit.
UNDOING ENDOGENOUS DOLLARIZATION
In the previous model, under imperfect information, endogenous dollarization arises due to the combination of a positive correlation between currency and default risk and the equal treatment of peso and dollar deposits in the event of a bank default. As noted, the first component seems to realistically characterize the context of many developing economies where financial dollarization generates a currency mismatch. Regarding the second component, equal treatment appears to be in practice more the rule than the exception. Bankruptcy laws do not adjust creditors' assets for their currency of denomination, and virtually no court would deviate from the pro rata principle that we use as a benchmark. Similarly, DISs tend to cover both local and foreign-currency deposits in the same terms. The case of an LLR is even clearer, since central banks are not known to base their assistance to particular banks on the currency composition of their portfolios above and beyond what it is required by prudential regulations. It is easy to conceive undoing mechanisms for the last two cases. If the central bank can commit to an LLR rule contingent on the degree of dollarization of the bank, such that β(λ), β′(λ) Ͻ 0, can readily undo the distortion associated with the bank insurance policy. In this case,
can be set to the desired level of dollarization by making β(λ) arbitrarily steeper.
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Similarly, a DIS can avoid introducing a dollarization bias by limiting its coverage to a fixed share of the principal valued at the ex-ante exchange rate, thus equalizing the payoffs across currencies in default states and making s(λ) ϭ 0. 33 Alternatively, the insurance scheme may modify ex-ante funding costs by charging an insurance premium. A higher premium for dollar deposits, by raising the cost of dollar funding, may undo (or even revert) the bias.
Undoing dollarization for the first, more general case, however, may be an uphill task. Amendments of the bankruptcy law are always difficult to justify in practice. But even if they were not, the general form of such amendments would not be straightforward.
Consider seniority, for example. On the one hand, a currency seniority clause that provides absolute priority to peso depositors may penalize dollar funding excessively in those cases in which some degree of dollarization is warranted (for 32. In the absence of commitment, implicit bank insurance would reintroduce the bias. Note that the commitment problem is likely to be less serious an obstacle for a deposit insurance rule that equalizes returns across depositors than for an LLR rule that, besides discriminating between banks, entails the often troublesome decision to close institutions in a context of a financial crisis triggered by a devaluation.
33. As noted above, simply failing to recognize the valuation gains of dollar deposits since the interest rate spread would introduce a bias that favors the currency that is expected to depreciate. example, when there is a dollar component in the product mix). On the other hand, absolute priority does not necessarily eliminate the dollarization bias. Take the case in which θR Ͼ r p , so that the priority clause automatically ensures that peso depositors are always repaid in full. Then, δ p (λ,e) ϭ 1 and
so that the larger the devaluation, the smaller the recovery ratio for dollar depositors. However, dollar recovery values decline with the size of the devaluation for depositors in both currencies. Indeed,
so that the dollarization bias, while smaller, is still there. This simply reflects the fact that endogenous dollarization in our model is not the result of a non-exclusivity problem but rather the consequence of a cash flow mismatch between creditors and debtors. 34 In light of this, prudential regulation appears to be a more natural way to address this mismatch. For example, one option may be to require higher provisioning ratios for dollar loans that, rather than altering default payoffs to depositors, raise the effective cost of dollar relative to peso funds to the bank.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper developed a simple framework to understand the interaction between depositors, banks, and the central bank in a bi-currency banking sector with exchange rate risk. It departed from the traditional model of Kareken and Wallace (1978) in that banks choose the currency composition of their deposit portfolio for a given asset structure.
We found that, if deposit rates cannot be set contingent on the banks dollarization ratio (in our case, due to the unobservability of the currency composition of bank deposits), the equal treatment of peso and dollar claims in the event of a bank default, by raising the peso-dollar interest rate spread above the effective relative funding costs faced by banks, generates an incentive to dollarize deposits. This result links the characteristics of the banking safety net scheme (loss-sharing policy, deposit and bank insurance) to the equilibrium currency composition of deposits. When safety nets do not discriminate between currencies, part of the exchange rate insurance of dollar deposits is extended to the default scenario at the expense of peso depositors or the government. Risk-neutral depositors price this benefit of dollar deposits into lower dollar rates relative to peso rates. Banks, however, do not pay 34. Note that the same caveat applies to the use of secured debt as an undoing mechanism, inasmuch as the value of the collateral is eroded by a depreciation of the peso. the higher costs of dollar deposits in the event of default and thus find it cheaper to finance their projects through dollar funding.
This result differs from those in the existing literature in two important ways. First, the incentive to dollarize is present even in the absence of government or private exchange rate guarantees. We show that, if a depreciation of the local currency increases the bank's probability of default, a simple pro rata distribution of the residual value of the bank induces financial dollarization that is excessive relative to a central planner's choice. Second, we find that a currency-blind deposit insurance creates incentives to dollarize that arise from its effect on the pricing of deposits rather than from the well-known moral hazard consequences of insurance. Moral hazard does play a role in the case of bank insurance (LLR) that lead banks to increase the level of deposit dollarization, since part of the cost of this action is transferred to the provider of the insurance services. As such, our findings provide an alternative explanation for the much-discussed issue of the prevalent use of the foreign currency in financial intermediation in most bi-monetary economies.
On the positive front, this paper highlights the challenges that a bi-currency financial sector raises for the standard currency-blind nature of banking practices which are typically conceived with single-currency developed economies in mind. The negative externalities associated with deposit dollarization (due to the presence of liquidation costs) are no different than those associated with excessive bank risk-taking of any kind, and may warrant the introduction of specific prudential regulations or amendments to existing bankruptcies procedures in order to undo the dollarization bias discussed here.
Finally, our focus on banks allowed us to study the influence of deposit insurance and central bank assistance on dollarization. However, the insights of Section 1 could be readily extended in two additional dimensions. First, it is straightforward to see how the main result could be readily applied to direct financing of a firm through standard debt contracts. In this case, a currency-blind liquidation policy would foster dollar financing from firms. Unlike deposits, however, loan contracts can be specialized to limit the firm's capacity to dilute the creditor's claim. In particular, they can be set contingent to firm-specific characteristics which may attenuate the externality analyzed in this paper.
Second, the setup employed in this paper could be used to explain the tendency of both the private and public sectors in most developing countries to seek finance abroad in foreign currencies. In the presence of a non-negligible probability of default, foreign investors, anticipating an equal treatment across currencies in the event of default, would demand local currency premiums deemed excessive by local borrowers, thus inducing the dollarization of external debt.
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Further refinements of the model in this paper should introduce non-exchange raterelated risk (from which we deliberately abstracted), and endogenize the exchange rate (to reflect the incidence of balance-sheet costs in the government reaction to sudden adverse exchange rate shocks). Regarding the former, our conjecture is that, inasmuch as the debtor's capacity to pay is correlated with the exchange rate, 35. See Chamón (2001) for a model along these lines. the qualitative results should remain. Indeed, if real exchange rates tended to move procyclically (as is certainly the case in most developing countries), credit risk would be correlated with the real exchange rate even in the absence of balance-sheet effects. As for the latter, if the anticipation of an exchange rate defense favors deposit dollarization, then higher dollarization ratios, associated with higher balance-sheet costs, should make the defense ever more likely, reinforcing the effects described in this paper. Both issues certainly deserve a more careful (analytical and empirical) exploration. This, combined with the fact that, for λ Ͼ 0, s(λ) Ͼ 00π'(λ) Ͼ 0, implies that the equilibrium for ρ ϭ 0 (alternatively, for the static problem) is at λ ϭ 1. To show that λ ϭ 0 is not an equilibrium, it suffices to show that, for ρʦ(0,ρ c ],
APPENDIX
there is some feasible λʦ(0,1] such that V(λ e ϭ 0,λ ϭ 0) Ͻ V(λ e ϭ 0,λ ϭ λ). In particular, we do that for λ ϭ 1. Denoting functions of λ, g (λ), as g λ ϭ g(λ e ϭ 0,λ) to simplify notation, we obtain:
or, rearranging, ρ ≤ ρ c ϭ r f Ϫ e _ 1 R e m R Ϫ e _ 1 R .
Perfect information with partial deposit insurance
Here we derive conditions under which any perfect information equilibrium entails a non-zero dollarization ratio, for the case in which the DIS coverage always exceeds the bank's liquidation value, that is, k ≥ max δ(e,λ) ϭ θ.
It can be shown that, for any deposit insurance coverage k Ͼ , there is a critical discount factor, ρ c (k), such that for any ρ Ͻ ρ c (k ), any perfect information equilibrium λ DIS must satisfy λ DIS Ͼ λ* ϭ 0. Following the steps of Proposition 3, and using r d ϭ , it suffices to show that
where g λ ϭ g(λ e ϭ λ,λ). This condition holds iff
Rearranging, we obtain the following expression for ρ c , 
